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Fiscal Decentralization and Its Effect on Poverty 
Evidence from Panel Data on the lower 48 American States 
By: Nicholas Valaris 
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Abstract: This study examines the effect of local and state fiscal autonomy on the poverty rate in 
the U.S. from 1980-2000. The findings are that the gap between own revenues and own 
expenditures, known as Ve11ical Imbalances, has an optimal level at which the negative influence 
on poverty is at its maximum. Shifts along the Vertical Imbalances curve towards the optimal 
value cause reductions in the poverty rate by hlmdredths of a percent. Convergence towards the 
optimal Vertical Imbalances value is still recommended as a reduction in poverty could be 
achieved by incuning little to no economic cost. 
Introduction 
In recent years financial decentralization has become an increasingly popular method of 
governance for nations of all types. This process, in which a central government confers greater 
autonomy on its sub-national governments, is believed to lend itself to a number of desirable 
) outcomes. Political scientists and economists theorize that devolving authority over revenue 
collection and/or expenditures leads to greater efficiencies on a number of fronts. For example, 
fiscal decentralization has been recognized for its potential at combating poveliy and inciting 
improvements in public services. Yet financial decentralization's purported benefits are 
examined very differently depending on whether the context is a developing or developed nation. 
When the country of concern is of third-world status, the question most often asked is how 
financial decentralization would facilitate a reduction in poverty. Conversely, when a post-
industrial country is the focus, academics are most interested in its effect on economic growth. 
My objective is to examine whether or not this administrative approach has effectively decreased 
poveliy rates in the United States in the years 1980-2000. Should financial decentralization's 
potential for poverty reduction in Amelica be confirmed, the policy implications will be 
considerable. Then, we could confidently prescribe it as a low-cost method by which a given 
jurisdiction can lessen its number of citizens living in poverty. Such an option would be 
especially attractive in the current economic climate, where a prolonged recession has depleted 
many states' financial resources. 
Literature Review 
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Financial devolution has been conjectured to fight poverty in a number of ways. First, it 
is thought to create an environment that is conducive for economic growth. Prevailing theory 
holds that decentralized states have more flexibility in designing region-specific policies 
concerning infrastructure and human capital investments, as well as the fiscal capacity to realize 
them (Oates, 1999). More efficient investment strategies will greatly augment the capital base, 
and facilitate accelerated economic growth. The "productivity enhancement" theory also features 
improved public service provision and investment as an outcome. With responsibility for such 
activities squarely on local governments, they are incentivized to minimize production costs and 
make such activities as efficient as possible (McNab and Vazquez, 2003). As compelling as these 
theories may be, we cannot draw any firm conclusions about the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth. Conjecture alone is of little use in the face of complex 
real-world dynamics. Oates conditions all his arguments in favor of financial decentralization by 
saying " ... all the potential ... for improving economic performance must be evaluated in terms of 
the specific characteristics that characterize the current state of the developing nation" (Oates, 
1999, P. 24). True to word, empirical analysis conducted on fiscal decentralization's contribution 
to economic growth has offered no clear answers, but instead produced a great deal of 
contradictory results. 
Some studies on the nature ofthis relationship have found a negative correlation between 
sub-national government autonomy and growth rates. Sixteen central and Eastern European 
countries were examined in the years immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
order to determine whether they were benefitting from a decentralized administrative structure. 
The findings showed that expenditures and transfers to sub-national governments had a soundly 
negative correlation to national growth rates (Rodrigues-Pose and Kroijer, 2009). However, local 
level taxes were found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the pace of economic 
expansion. The authors note that their conclusions are consistent with other studies that have 
analyzed financial decentralization implemented in developing countries. Specifically, they 
attribute the negative correlations as the consequences of devolving authority to the local level 
when municipal governments do not yet have the administrative capacity to efficiently serve 
their populaces. 
) 
) 
) 
While fiscal devolvement may have been counterproductive for the former Eastern bloc 
countries, China has shown that a middle-income country can successfully enact this approach 
and reap its benefits. Using a panel data set 30 Chinese provinces from 1994-2002, Ying Ding 
regressed GPP (Gross Provincial Product) against an array of decentralization measures and 
control variables. Ding grouped the provinces into three zones, the Eastern, Central, and 
Western, which exhibit varying levels of industrialization and development. For all three, the 
expenditure measure of decentralization was positively and significantly correlated (Ding, 2007). 
The revenue measure was negative and insignificant for two of the three zones, though the author 
attributed this result more to the faultiness ofthe indicator than to real-world trends. Regardless, 
Ding's study is significant for demonstrating that financial decentralization has the potential to 
accelerate growth for middle-income countries also. 
An unequivocally positive connection between financial decentralization and economic 
growth has been more consistently demonstrated when a developed economy is the object of 
study. Akai and Sakata's research showed that after income distribution, the quality of human 
capital, economic structure, region-specific characteristics, and a host of other factors had been 
controlled for, the more fiscally decentralized U.S. states experienced higher levels of economic 
growth in recent decades (Akai and Sakata, 2002). In a follow-up study, Akai and Sakata set out 
to find the exact channels through which financial decentralization facilitates economic growth. 
They introduce the concept of "complementarity" , which expresses the ease with which a well-
executed public output can compensate for an underperformi'ng project in a nearby jurisdiction. 
When "local complementarity" (intra-regional) is sufficiently lower than "global 
complementarity" (inter-regional), risk-sharing between local and central governments becomes 
more advantageous (Akai, Sakata, and Nishimura, 2007). Then, the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic growth can be modeled as a parabola, the interior maximum of 
which denotes an optimal level of decentralization with respect to growth. Using a panel data set 
of the United States from the 1990s, the authors' empirical test validates their theoretical 
framework. Going one step further, Akai, Sakata, and Nishimura calculate the location of the 
fifty states on the parabola and determine that many of them could further decentralize to reach 
the inflection point, and thus optimize growth. 
Later studies validate the "hump shaped" relationship between faster economic growth 
and financial decentralization on a broader scale. While examining all the OECD nations (except 
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Luxembourg) over the span of 1970-2000, Ulrich Thiessen noticed that most member countries 
had converged on a moderate level of fiscal decentralization. Ceteris parabus, states that had 
achieved a balance of authority between central and local levels had higher overall growth rates, 
higher figures for investment as a share of GDP, and larger Total Factor Productivity rates. 
Conversely, countries situated at the extremes (very centralized or decentralized) experienced 
lower rates of all three measures. The author's conclusion was that the parabola is a fitting 
description for the interplay between growth and fiscal decentralization in developed countries, 
though he qualifies the robustness of the findings by highlighting the weakness inherent in his 
small sample size. 
A legitimate question that arises in the discussion of governmental devolution is whether 
localities with limited fiscal capacity can adequately function with greater autonomy. Critics 
have speculated that such cities would allocate their expenditures toward fostering commercial 
activity to the detriment of providing social services, if given free reign over their finances. 
Lobao and Kraybill study the presence of a trade-off between these two objectives using panel 
data on 46 U.S states from 1980-2005. They found no evidence that financial decentralization 
precipitates increased expenditures on business attraction in poverty-stricken municipalities. 
Even during the severe recession that followed 9111, poorer cities expanded their social service 
provision in line with their richer counterparts (Lobao and Kraybill, 2009). The authors 
concluded that no such reservations should be harbored concerning the fiscal empowerment of 
economically depressed localities. 
In addition to slowing down economic growth, poorly implemented fiscal 
decentralization can cause other consequences as well. One study demonstrate that if 
Intergovernmental Transfers from the Federal level become too large a share in state and local 
expenditures, corruption among public officials increases. In this context, corruption is defined 
as share of arrests of public officials due to charges of abuse of public office in total population. 
The authors term the mismatch between own revenues and own expenditures as "vertical 
imbalances". Their results show that a one standard deviation increase in vertical imbalances 
causes a 40% standard deviation increase in corruption (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). The authors 
speculate that this effect is induced by the officials now operating under a "soft budget 
constraint". Politicians that are accustomed to a soft budget constraint may not be properly 
incentivized to allocate resources efficiently, maximize the returns on their tax revenues, or 
) 
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evince any ofthe desirable characteristics that financial decentralization is thought to bring 
about. In this scenario, officials may be less responsible with public funds and take more liberties 
with their position in general. Thus when the fiscal decentralization is extremely asymmetric in 
nature, there is a higher likelihood that state and local officials will be corrupt. 
In a similar vein, revenue decentralization has been shown to increase income inequality 
in the presence of weak government. Bilin Neyapti explains that local government capture by the 
interest groups that represent powerful firms can lead to inefficient revenue collection. 
Influential economic agents use their grip on local authorities to avoid paying their share of 
taxes. In this scenario, the middle and lower-income classes disproportionately bear the brunt of 
financially supporting municipals governments (Neyapti 2006). The income inequality in such a 
society thusly increases. However, this effect is reversed if revenue decentralization is 
undertaken by a competent government. Presumably, local governments here are more immune 
to the demands of powerful economic actors, and the latter does not exert as much of a 
distortionary effect on the rest of society. When economic agents are contributing their fair share 
to the local administration, revenue decentralization works to decrease income inequality. 
Even if a nation or state achieves accelerated economic growth, that in itself is no 
guarantee that its poverty rate will diminish. In his primer on growth and poverty reduction, 
Martin Ravallion identifies the fundamental prerequisites of a pro-poor outcome. He notes the 
essentially of "reducing the antecedent inequalities that limit the prospects for poor people to 
share in the opportunities unleashed in a growing economy" (Ravallion, 2005, P. 20). This is 
largely accomplished by changing the income distribution, which in tum hinges upon a host of 
factors. One commonality Ravallion found across countries was a great disparity in levels of 
geographic or sectoral growth. The author cautions against provinces, states, or localities being 
left behind when their economic prospects do not coincide with national trends or goals. A pro-
poor growth strategy will not neglect the less dynamic or industrialized regions of a country, but 
devote sufficient attention to them in order that they can prosper as well. Devolving 
administrative and fiscal authority to a given jurisdiction thus seems an effective way to ensure 
that a locality's interests are furthered, and pro-poor growth achieved. 
Economic growth aside, fiscal decentralization is believed to achieve a pro-poverty 
outcome by other means also. Proponents hold that conferring greater autonomy on a state or city 
leads to social service provision whose nature and structure more closely reflects local needs 
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(Jutting, Corsi, and Stockmayer, 2005). Eliminating the gap between the administrators 
responsible for the programs' execution and the intended recipients ensures that social services 
are more responsive and better targeted (Jutting, Corsi, and Stockmayer, 2005). Additionally, the 
output of public goods will correspond with the level of need for such resources in a fiscally 
decentralized locale (Oates, 1995). This precludes the inevitable pitfalls that accompany a 
centrally-planned approach. There, funds for public goods are distributed uniformly among the 
recipients without regard for the severity of need of each. Invariably, the result is shortages and 
surpluses among the lower level governments, which is unquestionably a sub-optimal outcome. 
Lastly, fiscal decentralization is theorized to lead to a more economically equitable 
society due to the increased political participation it engenders. Generally, the more 
economically disenfranchised an individual, the less willing and able they are to press for their 
needs and articulate their interests through the proper channels. A more autonomous local state 
remedies this disconnect by bringing the lower classes into closer contact with the public 
officials responsible for their welfare. Personal interaction between politician and citizen makes 
the latter much more difficult to ignore. As the poor are now in a better position to express their 
desires and affect change, their vulnerability and voicelessness are thought to drastically 
diminish (Jutting, Corsi, and Stockmayer, 2005). Thusly politically empowered, lower socio-
economic classes can now advocate for higher-quality social services, more progressive laws, 
and other measures that will help them escape from poverty. 
Through all of the aforementioned channels, financial decentralization is theorized to lead 
to a pro-poor outcome. My immediate aim is not to substantiate the existence of these separate 
channels, but rather to show that their confluence has a net negative effect on poverty. 
Specifically, I will show the existence of a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization 
and poverty rates among the lower 48 United States. 
Data 
The United States of America provides ample material for a comprehensive case study in 
the influence of decentralization on the level of poverty in a developed nation. Focusing on the 
U.S. offers several advantages over cross-national data. First, to juxtapose countries with wildly 
different levels of industrialization and economic maturity is to group together fundamentally 
different units of observation. Doing so hinders any efforts to distinguish fiscal decentralizations ' 
) 
unambiguous effect. Secondly, other papers examine time periods during which countries 
experienced periods of rapid growth and activity. Akai and Sakata argue that fiscal 
decentralization operates sub-optimally in such scenarios, which leads to distorted results (Akai 
and Sakata, 2002). The relative political and cultural homogeneity of the United States, as well 
as the many periods of moderate economic expansion it has experienced, allowed both ofthese 
issues to be avoided in this investigation. 
The highly varying degree of autonomy among state governments will allow us to 
examine whether there exists a relationship between a state's governance structure and the 
standard of living of its citizens. America also has the advantage of allowing political and 
cultural factors to be safely controlled for. Their relative equality in terms of industrialization 
and modernity also help ensure the robustness of the results. Simultaneously, the states exhibit a 
sufficiently high degree of heterogeneity in poverty rates as well as in several measures of fiscal 
decentralization. In addition, studying the American states also has the distinct advantage over 
cross-national data sets in that variables are uniform in their definitions. For example, America 
has utilized a single definition of the Poverty Rate since it began tracking such information. 
Conversely, different nations may calculate their poverty rate using different measures. Studies 
which aggregate data measured by various indicators into one measure will produce results that 
are not as reliable. As the Table of Means indicates, there exists a huge range of both fiscal 
autonomy and poverty among the United States. 
Table 1: Tables of Means 
Fiscal Decentralization 
Measure 
Minimum Maximum Standard" Z~~ 
~ ~""'~ 
Deviation 
.: ~ 
State Poverty Rate 2.9% 27.2% 13.2% .040 
Connecticut - 1993 Mississippi - 1994 
Revenue Indicator 18.9% 66.2% 39.6% .080 
Delaware - 1998 Nebraska - 1982 
Expenditure Indicator 21.3% 74.1% 52.6% .094 
Wyoming - 1984 Wisconsin - 1991 
Vertical Imbalances 9.2% 29.7% 17.4% .037 
Arizona - 1988 Vermont - 1980 
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Human Capital Attainment 23% 63.5% 48.3% 6.47% 
Wyoming - 1994 Delaware - 1993 
Union Member Density 3.3% 38.3% 15.3% 6.55% 
North Carolina - 1999 West Virginia - 1981 
Real Per Capita Gross State $7,005 $41,920 $18,259 $6,169 
Product Mississippi - 1980 Connecticut - 2000 
State GINI Coefficient 34.8% 51.8% 41.1% 2.9% 
New Hampshire - 1987 South Dakota - 1997 
Share of Agricultural 17% 1% 4.4% 3% 
Employment Delaware - 2000 New Jersey - 1990 
Share of Manufacturing 3.3% 27.5% 14% 5.3% 
Employment Wyoming - 1984 North Carolina - 1980 
Share of Service Employment 15.8% 43.3% 26.3% 4.7% 
South Carolina - 1980 Nevada - 1981 
Log of Corruption -9.85 .755 -2.92 2.38 
This study utilizes U.S. Census panel data from the year 1980-2000. For each state it 
reports own-tax revenues, intergovernmental transfers to the state and national level, own-
expenditures, and state and federally mandated expenditures for each year. This will allow the 
construction of the fiscal decentralization indicators that will serve as my principal explanatory 
variables. The Census also features tables of annualized poverty rates for all forty-eight states for 
the aforementioned time span, thus providing the data for our dependent variable. 
We follow previous studies for direction in which control variables to include in our 
specifications. GINI coefficients are used to control for varying levels of income inequality 
among the states. Ceteris paribus, we believe that income inequality will correlate positively with 
poverty. The data for the GINI coefficients also originates from the U.S. Census. Real per capita 
gross state product is included in order to control for varying standards of living. We theorize 
that real per capita GSP will correlate negatively with poverty, as higher incomes necessarily 
mean less people subsisting below the poverty line. Figures for nominal per capita were 
extracted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the converted into real terms with a GSP 
deflator. I control for ,divergent education levels by including states' average high school 
graduation rates. The level of human capital attainment is accompanied by a quadratic term in 
) 
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order to account for formal education's non-linear relationship with poverty. We hypothesize 
that education will work to diminish poverty only after it has reached a certain point. 
Accordingly, the level should be positive while the quadratic is negative. Estimates of state 
graduation rates for some years were taken from the U.S. Census, with figures for all missing 
years interpolated by Economist Mark W. Frank in one of his studies (Frank, 2009). Union 
Member Density measures the strength of union presence for each state, the net effect of which 
is unknown. Figures were taken from unionstats.com. The economic composition of a state is 
controlled for with a host of sector employment measures. The employment share of 
manufacturing, agriculture, and services in the total economy inform us as to which industries 
increase or diminish poverty. Totals for each sector were divided by the employment total to 
obtain the share, all of which was provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
History of Fiscal Decentralization in America 
The fiscal autonomy of a given unit of government has two principal dimensions: 
revenue and expenditure decisions. The degree to which a government has discretion over those 
two aspects informs us as to how financially independent it is. With regard to revenues, local and 
state governments have had command over as much as 66% oftheir income stream, and as little 
as 19% over the twenty-one year period. However most states have gravitated towards the 
average of 40%, as the standard deviation is only 2.3%. Collectively, the states experienced an 
8% decline in revenue autonomy from 1980 to 2000, dropped from 40% revenue autonomy to 
36%. There were 9 states that were driving this change especially strongly. Wyoming underwent 
a dramatic 50% shift in revenue autonomy, starting at 41 % in 1980 and ending at 20% in 2000. 
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin also saw declines greater than 25%. Conversely, three 
states decentralized significantly with respect to revenues: Indiana at 8%, Nevada at 10%, and 
South Carolina at 25%. Examining the states within their respective census regions yields even 
clearer insights into the trends of the recent past. The Midwest underwent an 11 % drop in 
revenue autonomy, with nearly that entire decline taking place in the 1990s. The revenue 
autonomy of the West rose in excess of 40% in the mid-1980s, remained constant for ten years, 
and then dropped to 34% by 2000. The net change was a 9.5% decrease. The North East was 
fairly static in this regard for most of the sample period, then saw a 9.5% drop in the last five 
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years of the sample. The Southeast was stable throughout the 21 year time span, and is unique in 
that it experienced minimal net change during the sample period. 
The indicator for expenditure autonomy fluctuated much more wildly for sub-national 
governments. The mean for the two decades was 53%, and the minimum and maximum were 
21 % and 74%, respectively. The standard deviation of the expenditure autonomy indicator was 
fairly large at 9%. The absolute value of the annual percent change in expenditure autonomy was 
23%, which also informs as to its erratic nature. Collectively the states underwent an increase of 
7% in expenditure autonomy from 1980 to 2000. Four states saw a drop of over 25%, including 
Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, and Louisiana. Simultaneously, 11 states had their expenditure autonomy 
increase by over 40%. Virginia was far and away the leader with a jump of 91 % in expenditure 
autonomy. When broken down by census region, each of the four sectors demonstrates a distinct 
trend in this regard. With respect to expenditure autonomy the Midwest fluctuated wildly, rising 
as high as 60% in some years and falling as low as 40% in others. By the year 2000 it had settled 
at 41 %, which equates to -12% shift. The evolution of expenditure autonomy was similar in the 
Northeast, which oscillated in the range of 42%-60%. By the year 2000 it had command over 
48% of its expenditures, which represents a 7% rise. The Southeast and West saw similar 
movements of expenditure autonomy during these 21 years, and had increases of 14.5% and 
4.5%, respectively. 
Vertical Imbalances averaged 17.4% over the sample period, the maximum observed 
value being 30% and the minimum 9.25%. The average standard deviation was 1.84%, 
indicating the values were tightly clustered about the mean. The average annual percent change 
was .4%, showing that changes in Vertical Imbalances occurred in small shifts. As a nation, 
Vertical Imbalances was 11.16% lower than its 1980 value. The states most responsible for 
spurring Virginia, Nevada, Delaware, and Massachusetts all experienced negative percent 
changes in excess of 30% during the sample period. Nevada and Nebraska were outliers at the 
other extreme, with positive percent changes in excess of 20%. In regional terms, the four census 
territories took highly divergent paths with regard to vertical Imbalances. The Midwest had an 
average value of 19% in 1980 and ended at 18% in 2000, which translates to a 4.8% decline. 
Vertical imbalances in the Northeast began at 21.5%, sank to as low as 14.5% in the early 1990s 
but rebounded to 17.5% by 2000. The net change in the Northeast was thus an 18.5% decrease 
during the sample period. Vertical imbalances in the Southeast and West followed the same 
) 
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trajectory as in the Northeast, though its net change was smaller at a 10.5% and 13% decrease, 
respectively. 
The trends in fiscal decentralization we observe among the states and four census regions 
are consistent with the findings of Wallis and Oates in their study "Decentralization of the Public 
Sector: An Empirical Study of State and Local Government". First, these authors discovered that 
fiscal decentralization increases with population size. Our anecdotal data substantiate this 
assertion, with Delaware, North Dakota, and Idaho occupying spots in the bottom ten in rankings 
of both population and revenue decentralization for 1980. Similarly, four states appear in the top 
ten with regard to both population size and revenue decentralization in 1980, those being New 
York, Texas, Illinois, and Florida. In 1990, we see that most of the same states have maintained 
their position. Delaware, North Dakota, and Idaho are again in the bottom ten states with the 
smallest population and least fiscally decentralized. Illinois, Florida, and New York are again 
among the ten states with the highest populations and levels of revenue decentralization, with 
Texas joining their rankings. The correlation between population size and revenue 
decentralization appears to have strengthened with the passage oftime. In 2000, five states are in 
the bottom ten for both lists: Wyoming, Vermont, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Idaho. 
Additionally, five were still in the top ten with respect to population and revenue 
decentralization: Georgia, Illinois, Florida, New York, and Texas. 
Wallis and Oates also find that higher income states are more centralized with respect to 
their expenditures. Indeed, West Virginia and Kentucky are in the bottom ten states in terms of 
real per capita income, but in the top ten states for expenditure decentralization in 1980. In 1990, 
Louisiana, Kentucky, and Idaho are all in the bottom ten states for per capita income, but the top 
ten states for expenditure decentralization. New Jersey and Virginia have two of the highest 
standards of living of the 48 sample states, and are also among the least decentralized in 
expenditures for 1990. In the year 2000, West Virginia, Alabama, and Utah are in the bottom ten 
states with regard to real per capita income, as well as in the ten most decentralized states with 
respect to expenditures. Illinois is the only state to appear in both the ten states with the highest 
real per capita income and the smallest level of expenditure decentralization in 2000. 
Lastly, Wallis and Oates discovered that Southern states are inherently more centralized, 
especially compared to their northeastern counterparts. 
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DeImition of Poverty 
A crucial first step in any effort to improve the welfare of the poor in America is to 
properly define poverty. Only then we can ascertain what proportion of the population is living 
below an acceptable limit. The definition of poverty most commonly referenced, and the one I 
use, is the u.s. Census Bureau's. The Census uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by 
family size and composition to determine who falls below the poverty line. Households that 
theoretically cannot meet their basic consumption needs, which include food and non-food 
needs, are defined as living in poverty. Therefore, the poverty line can be thought of as being the 
minimum expenditure necessary to meet basic food and non-food needs. The Census' poverty 
thresholds were originally devised in 1963 using U.S. Department of Agriculture food budgets 
calculated for families under economic duress. They then used other data to determine what 
share of total expenditures food purchases are on average for American families. Combining this 
information, the U.S. Census arrived at the definition of the poverty line that is still in effect. 
This approach to discerning the extent of poverty in American is subject to a number of 
criticisms, though. First, it fails to take into account the severity of poverty. Families could be 
subsisting slightly below the threshold, indicating a moderate degree of poverty. They could also 
be living in considerable deprivation far below the threshold, but there is no way of knowing 
under the current guidelines. Secondly, the poverty line uses the household as its unit of 
observation. Therefore, it implicitly assumes that poverty is uniformly distributed across a given 
household. In instances in which the elderly, children, and females are treated unequally, they 
would take on a disproportionate share of the poverty of that household. In this respect the 
Census' poverty line also fails to capture the severity of poverty bourn by individuals. Third, the 
poverty threshold does not vary geographically, despite the fact that price levels vary 
considerably across different regions of the U.S. Consequently, the degree of poverty would be 
far greater for a family living in a costlier locality, ceteris paribus. 
The Census' poverty definition is thus severely flawed and subject to a great many 
limitations. Its virtue is that there exists an abundance of data on it at the state level, which serves 
my purposes well. The Census' definition is therefore my poverty measure of choice in this 
study. 
) 
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Recent History of Poverty in America 
From 1980 to 2000, the American states had an average poverty rate of 13.22%. The 
figure in 1980 was 12.5% and in 2000 was 15.13%, which comes out to a 26% increase. The 
average annual percent change was 2.3%, and the standard deviation was 2%. There were several 
notable outlier states that we observed; for instance, Nevada, Wisconsin, and Connecticut 
experience drops in their poverty rate of 20% or more. The states driving the general trend were 
Minnesota, West Virginia, and New Hampshire, all of which had percent increases of70% or 
higher. With regard to Census regions, all four underwent net increase in the poverty rate. The 
Northeast's rate began at about 10% and held fairly constant until the last few years of the 
sample, during which it climbed to 13%. Its net change was thus a 28% increase. The Midwest 
began at 11.5% of its populace living under poverty, and spent the duration of the sample 
fluctuating between 11-14.5%. It finally settled at 13.5%, which equates to a 14.5% increase. 
The West had a starting poverty rate of 12.3%, which grew steadily until finishing at 15%. The 
fraction of citizens living in poverty thus increased by 23%. The Southeast experienced the most 
dramatic shift of all: a 32.7% increase in the poverty rate. Its figure as of 1980 was already high 
at 15%, and ended at about 20%. 
Empirical Approach 
In my most parsimonious model, I regress state poverty rates onto each of the six proxies 
for financial decentralization. I then expand the model to include that proxy's quadratic term, as 
well as control for a number of pertinent variables. Single variable or groups of like variables are 
added in one at a time. For example, percentage of state population under the age of 19 and 
percentage 65 or above enter into the model at once. I employ a two-way fixed-effects model for 
every specification in order to control for state-specific characteristics that persist through time. 
Year binary variables are utilized to control for time-specific shocks that would otherwise bias 
my findings. The model is thus specified as 
PRjt = bo + b1FDj + b2FDj2 +b3 Xjt + (liSi + (ljYt + ejt. 
Financial Decentralization Indicators 
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In order to properly gauge the effects of financial decentralization, the first step is 
necessarily to create a proxy or group of proxies that accurately indicate the degree of autonomy 
a local government exercises. At first, it would seem intuitive to consider a municipality's share 
of expenditures as a percent of total expenditure decisions as a measure of autonomy. Yet the 
presence of intergovernmental grants (I GRs) precludes this approach (Akai and Sakata, 2002). 
This is due to the fact that many IGRs are distributed to local governments with explicit 
conditions on how they can be utilized. Expenditures made possible by federal money due not 
reflect any decision-making on the part of a state government, and thus tell us nothing of its level 
of autonomy. Alternatively, it may be tempting to regard a state's level of tax revenues as an 
indicator of its financial independence. However unconditional lump-sum grants from the federal 
or administration add considerably to a state government's budget, greatly augmenting its fiscal 
independence (Akai and Sakata, 2002). Lump-sum grants therefore prevent tax revenues from 
serving as an accurate measure of a state's autonomy. 
One way to account for these distortions is to utilize several indices that inform us as to 
the level of a state's financial autonomy. Indicator 1: The Revenue Indicator is the ratio oflocal 
revenues to state and local government revenues combined (Akai and Sakata, 2002). The 
underlying assumption of this indicator is that all IGRs are conditional and thus do not contribute 
to a given state's fiscal independence (Akai and Sakata, 2002) Indicator 2: The Production 
Indicator is the ratio of local government expenditure to combined state and local government 
expenditure. The implicit assumption here is that the local government has complete autonomy 
with respect to its expenditure decisions, i.e., that all IGRs are unconditional. 
The last indicator I include is "Vertical Imbalances", the purpose of which is to gauge the 
overall autonomy achieved by a locality. It captures the gap between a locality'S expenditures 
and own revenues, with the difference being made up by federal intergovernmental grants. 
Accordingly, vertical imbalances are calculated as federal IGRs / combined state and local 
expenditures. Fishman and Gatti hypothesize that the larger the rift between own revenues and 
expenditures, the higher the likelihood of corruption and the less effective financial 
decentralization will be (Fishman and Gatti, 2001). This indicator will allow us to determine 
whether states and towns that decentralized symmetrically do indeed enjoy financial 
decentralization's theoretical benefits. 
} 
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Results 
Preliminary Results 
Many of the states in our sample exhibit trends in the financial decentralization indicators 
that correspond to increases or drops in the poverty rate that conform to our hypotheses. For 
example, Florida began in 1980 with a Vertical Imbalances value of 18.8%, which steadily 
decreases to 10.5% by 1991. During the same period, the poverty rate jumps from 11.6% to 
15.5%. This increase makes sense in light of the fact that the state and local governments have 
less access to federal funds. Michigan had a revenue decentralization value of 43.6% in 1991 
which shrank to 36.5% by 2000. A movement towards the poverty-maximizing revenue 
decentralization value of37% should increase a given state's poverty rate. Indeed, Florida's 
poverty rate grew from 13.3% to 16.2%. Mississippi began the sample period with a Vertical 
Imbalances value of23%, which is very close to the optimal value (20.7). By 1990, Mississippi's 
Vertical Imbalances had diminished to 15%. Simultaneously, revenue decentralization decreased 
from 48% to 43.4%. Both of these shifts should theoretically lead to an increase in poverty, and 
we do see the poverty rate go from 12.2% to 15.7%. 
Nebraska was an outlier in that it had the highest average for revenue decentralization 
from 1980-2000. In 1982 it had a value of66.25%, which diminished to 53.75% by 1997. Its 
Vertical Imbalances value in 1989 was 11.75% and grew to 15.8% by 2000. These movements in 
fiscal decentralization counteract one another, and the net effect on the poverty rate is 
indeterminate a priori. Indeed, Nebraska's poverty rate fluctuated about its mean of 11.25% 
during the twenty-one year sample period. Lastly, New Jersey went from being 43.25% revenue 
decentralized to 37.7% (the poverty-maximizing value) by 1989. Vertical balances decreased 
from 16.3% to 11.9% during that time. Accordingly, the poverty rate rose from 8% in 1980 to 
10.3% in 1990. 
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Table 2: Estimate of the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on Poverty 
Dependent Variable: State Poverty Rate, 1980-2000 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -7.06* -2.68 -.990 
(3.62) (3.31) (3.60) 
Revenue Indicator 21.4*** 
(8.25) 
Revenue Indicator2 -28.1 *** 
(10.4) 
Expenditure Indicator -1 .09** 
(.541) 
Vertical Imbalances -26.7* 
(15.1) 
Vertical Imba1ances2 74.2* 
(39.7) 
Log of Real Per Capita GSP -.0003*** -.0003*** -.0003*** 
(.00006) (.00006) (.00006) 
Share of Agricultural -9.16*** -8.96*** -9.80*** 
Employment (2.47) (2.46) (2.45) 
Share of Manufacturing -3.14 -3.55* -2.98 
Employment (1.95) (1.93) (1.95) 
Share of Service Employment -6.05* 
(3.65) 
Union Member Density -.063*** -.075*** -.070*** 
(.024) (.024) (.024) 
GINI Coefficient 6.70** 6.65** 7.34** 
(3.05) (3.06) (3.09) 
Log of Corruption .046* .054** .047* 
(.027) (.027) (.027) 
Lag 1 of Poverty .469*** .475*** .460*** 
(.026) (.026) (.026) 
Lag 2 of Poverty .192*** .194*** .184*** 
(.026) (.026) (.026) 
Human Capital Attainment 48.1 *** 48.3*** 50.3*** 
11.8 (11.7) (11.7) 
Human Capital Attainment2 -54.3*** -55.04*** -58.2*** 
(12.7) (12.6) (12.6) 
Number of Instruments 1.0e+03 1.0+03 1.0e+03 
Number of Observations 912 912 912 
) 
) 
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IWald Ch/ 2805.76 2749.28 2815.68 
Notes to Table 2: Standard errors in parenthesis. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor 
and Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Current Population Survey, and include all the 
lower 48 states between the years 1980-2000. Each regression includes binary variables for each sample 
state, as well as for each year 
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The negative coefficient on vertical imbalances (-.519) along with the positive coefficient on 
vertical imbalances squared (1.22) inform us that this variable exhibits a parabolic shape when 
graphed against the poverty rate. I calculate the inflection point to be .213, or 21.3 %. At this 
minimum, symmetric financial decentralization exerts its strongest negative effective on the 
Poverty Rate. To give a quantitative example, a given state that moves from 0% Vertical 
Imbalances to the optimal value would experience an approximately -.05% decrease on its 
poverty rate. 
Many of the control variables I included also became increasingly significant as I further 
specified my model. Share of Agriculture in total employment was negative and significant at the 
1 % level (, showing that states with agricultural sectors had slightly lower poverty rates. 
Conversely, employment share of manufacturing and service were negative and significant at the 
1 % and 5% level, respectively. Unemployment rate was negative and significant at the 1 % level, 
which contradicts economic theory on the topic. However, the small coefficient (-.0002) is 
economically insignificant. The variable percentage of population 65 or above was negative and 
significant at the 5% level with a sizeable coefficient (-.552), showing that states with larger 
shares of senior citizens have lower poverty rates. Human Capital Attainment was positive and 
significant at the 1 % level, though its quadratic is negatively signed and equally significant. 
Together, these variables inform us that poverty increases with a state's share of high school 
graduates until the inflection point of 52.6%. To give this figure a point of reference, the average 
of human capital attainment for the 21 year period is 48.3%. After passing the minimum, poverty 
and human capital attainment become inversely related. 
Economic Significance 
With the statistical significance of vertical imbalances thus proven, our attention now 
shifts onto the extent of its economic importance. The example given earlier of a state moving 
from 0% to 21.3% VI was admittedly unrealistic, as American states are typically situated in the 
10-30% range. It is rare for states to be on the beginning portion ofthe VI curve, where the 
elasticity of poverty with respect to VI is greatest. Consequently, potential real-world reductions 
in the poverty rate due to a movement towards the optimal VI level are decidedly modest. I use 
the data points on VI for each sample state in 2000 in order to ascertain their most recent position 
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on the curve. In this year, 36 states were operating below the optimal point, 9 states above, and 3 
states on it. I then calculated what the difference in poverty rates would be if all 48 states were 
instead operating at the minimum VI value. Multiplying these hypothetical poverty rates against 
state populations gives us the reduced number of citizens living under the poverty line in this 
scenario. The difference between observed values and fitted values shows reductions in poverty 
that can be realized by converging upon the optimal VI value. For the year 2000, a total of 
14,620 less people would be living under the poverty line if the government reallocated revenue 
and expenditure shares optimally 
Elevating only a few thousand people out of poverty in a national population of three 
hundred million admittedly seems like a trivial achievement at first. However, it must be kept in 
mind that these gains in social welfare can be attained by incurring little to no cost. All that is 
required is the u.s. government brought all states into the ideal balance between own revenues 
and own expenditures. Additionally, any gains in economic growth, human capital, and physical 
capital accumulate and persist through time. Increases in these three macroeconomic variables 
compound and serve to raise the standard ofliving for all generations indefinitely. Though the 
) levels of individuals exiting poverty may be small, the effect of increased economic growth and 
capital could become more pronounced over time. Granted, this outcome is contingent upon the 
theoretical channels through which fiscal decentralization reduces poverty being true. 
Conclusion 
Despite having proven the existence of a relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
poverty in America, there is still a great deal left to find out on this topic. Our results tell us 
nothing of the extent of social mobility achieved by individuals due to movements by their 
government towards the optimal VI value. That is, we do not know how far above the poverty 
line they ascended, nor how far below it they were to begin with. Similarly, our measures do not 
inform us of movements by citizens upwards within the 'poverty zone' . It could very well be that 
the severity of poverty was lessened for numerous individuals due to the effect of VI, even if 
they were not able to escape poverty ultimately. Third, we are ignorant as to which demographic 
groups benefit most from efficiently implemented fiscal decentralization. It remains to be seen 
whether some populations are more sensitive to a movement towards the VI optimal value, such 
as urban vs. rural , female vs. male, Hispanic vs. non-Hispanic, etc. 
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All of these shortcomings can be fully addressed in further studies. More comprehensive 
measures of poverty can be utilized in order to gain further insight into the effects caused by 
fiscal decentralization / centralization. For example, the Squared Poverty Gap measure could be 
employed to see what changes in standard of living those under the poverty line undergo. This 
way it could be determined whether the poverty gap is increased or lessened on average. The 
Watts Index is distinct in that it can be decomposed for different sub-populations, and would 
allow us to gain insight into these trends. Secondly, more recent data can be gathered on states ' 
fiscal autonomy, in order that their positions on the VI curve could be best calculated. Then 
meaningful policy recommendations could be given to public officials in order that they could 
either centralize or decentralize their administrations in order to approximate the optimal VI 
value. Third, the channels through which financial decentralization is thought to reduce poverty 
could be empirically tested to determine whether theory holds up in the real world. 
With respect to Channell: improved and expanded public goods and service, one could 
look at project outcomes for social welfare programs to see if they do achieve more quantitative 
success under an efficiently structured government. Changes in the size ofthe clientele base for 
the same public programs would clearly indicate whether such initiatives are growing or 
contracting in scope. For Channel 2: increased focus on human and physical capital, I plan on 
gathering data on education share of government expenditures and standardized test scores to 
examine changes in scholastic investment and quality, respectively. Studying the changes in 
government spending on infrastructure and communications would inform us as to whether 
optimally decentralized government indeed direct greater funds towards high-productivity 
sectors. 
) 
) 
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Appendix 
Table 3 Pairwise Correlations 
Revenue Indicator Expenditure Indicator Vertical Imbalances 
Revenue Indicator 1.000 
Expenditure Indicator .0048 1.000 
Vertical Imbalances -.0074 -.0302 1.000 
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